Monthly Archives: February 2011
The topic of empathy is an excuse for me to consider and summarize issues of embodiment and to encourage discussion. Empathy is only an example used to illustrate the numbered issues below. The same concerns hold relative to many person … Continue reading
In “Becoming a non-person” I asked about what capacities are successively lost, from a DP perspective, as a person deteriorates into the neurological ravages of AD. In an earlier post, Tony referred to “observation” as a core human competence. In … Continue reading
Alzheimer’s Disease (which, by the way, is very much not my speciality area) is characterized by progressive decline. In early stages, we might say, “that person has impairments.” In middle stages, we might say, “that is a case of a … Continue reading
Danziger, Faillenot, & Peyron (2009) report some interesting findings about empathy. Their study relates directly to my earlier post about mirror neurons – a topic that continues to receive a great deal of theoretical and empirical attention.
We have been using the phrase “provide for” to talk about the relationship between embodiment – particularly neurologic embodiment – and behavior. Embodiment provides for behavior. But what are we saying when we say something “provides for” behavior? Perhaps two … Continue reading
Without intending to stop exchanges to the previous post, I’m going to introduce here another line of conceptual interest. In the last post, the issue that led me to cite the Gallese & Sinigaglia (2010) review was my interest in … Continue reading